BOOK REVIEW—COMMAND AND CONTROL by Eric Schlosser
A weird confluence of incidents reminded me of a book that I had been meaning to take in, and as luck would have it, the library had the audiobook. I had a kind of a freakout after Trump’s demented speeches at Davos, realizing that this mentally compromised person was the sole and absolute commander of a few thousand nuclear weapons. This mad king has also been making noises about resuming atomic weapons testing, which is both illegal and immoral. Then, my sweetie, who has been catching up on back episodes of the “Welcome to Night Vale” podcast listened to the episode “The Deft Bowman,” which is a riff on a real-life, barely-averted nuclear war in the 1980’s caused by a NATO exercise called “Able Archer.” So I’ve been listening to Eric Schlosser’s “Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety.”
The nuclear genie has been out of the bottle for 80 years. We are not all dead from blast, burns, radiation sickness and nuclear winter. There has not been a nuke used in war since America bombed Nagasaki. There has not, as far as can be determined, ever been an accidental nuclear detonation. After taking in this book, one realizes that those three things are miraculously improbable. Also, one realizes that the movie “Dr. Strangelove” is damned close to a documentary. Having grown up in the ‘70’s and ‘80’s, and having visited Hiroshima in my teens, I’m probably a little more attuned to the threat of nukes than the average American, and the combination of recent events and this book leaves me very jittery indeed.
The development of the atomic bomb and the thermonuclear bomb is an amazing story, with human heroes and villains and staggering feats of intellect and organization. The very early decisions about its construction, use and control are the stuff of movies and opera (literally…as I write I am listening to “Doctor Atomic”). There is inspiration to be found in that story. But the first several decades of the our existence with the bomb were improvisatory, shaped by ignorance, heedless urgency, stupidity, paranoia, politics, and other ugly human traits.
Schlosser highlights the conflicts that determined the early history of atomic weapons. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower insisted on absolute civilian control of the weapons, but the military hated this. The United States insisted on absolute sovereignty over these weapons, but NATO allies (at whose bases the weapons were stationed) hated this. Generals wanted more and more weapons, down to the battalion level, but strategists hated this. Weapon designers grew increasingly concerned about safety and robustness to accidents—that is, making it less likely for a bomb to go off—and the armed forces hated this, because it increased the likelihood of a dud. All the while, there was political pressure from presidential candidates agitating about “bomber gaps” and “missile gaps” (perceived shortcomings in the arms race) to field as many bombs and weapons systems as possible, safety be damned.
By Kennedy’s time the world could very easily have been destroyed by accident. Hundreds of fragile atomic bombs were distributed throughout NATO countries. Command of these weapons had been “pre-delegated” to field commanders far below General rank. American control of these American weapons was nominal at best. The weapons were often poorly secured, guarded by a single sentry armed with a rifle for an 8-hour shift. The weapons were excessively delicate and hastily constructed. There were no “fail-safe” systems, they could be triggered by a single rifle shot or static electricity, and inspections found items such as screwdrivers and Allen wrenches had been accidentally left in the bombs. The early ballistic missiles had a less than 50% successful launch rate, and the strategic bombers using new technologies such as jets and aerial refueling had a tendency to catch fire, spontaneously release bombs, or crash.
Worse, there was no real strategy for using nukes beyond “use them all, and use them all at once.” Each branch of the armed forces had its own target list, so that a single target would be hit by several nukes. The “SIOP” (Single Integrated Operational Plan) was supposed to rationalize this, but it confirmed total commitment and allowed no flexibility, no pause for negotiation, no limited use…and no planning for what comes after. Presidents from Kennedy to G. W. Bush hated the SIOP, but never did more than tinker with it. For much of this time, America had a “Launch on Warning” strategy, that would trigger—with very few checks—a massive attack on the warning that enemy missiles had been launched.
This book focuses on American command and control systems, because that’s where the information is. The president is still the one person with ultimate launch authority, and the system is designed to obey, but the president’s choice sets off a fairly rigidly-specified chain reaction. The Soviets (later the Russians)—ironically, because they were totalitarian—had more flexibility, but chose not to use it. They created a “dead hand” system, like that in “Doctor Strangelove”—if any unknown nuclear explosion were detected in Soviet territory, a massive attack would automatically, autonomously be triggered. Like in the movie, they did not announce the existence of this system, and whether it is currently in effect is the subject of strategic ambiguity.
“Command and Control” focuses on what can and has gone wrong, both on a policy/strategic level, and in a highly detailed, minute-by-minute account of an accident at an American Titan II missile silo in Damascus, Arkansas in 1980. The tick-tock of the Damascus incident is gripping and suspenseful, and knowing how much could go wrong with hypergolic fuel, oxidizer, and a hydrogen bomb in a contained space, terrifying. The longer saga of how close calls—not a few, not tens, not hundreds, but thousands of close calls—brought us to the edge of the abyss will keep you awake at night for a long time. A flock of geese, a weather rocket, a misloaded computer tape, a misplaced foam cushion, a tired pilot, a blown tire, a capricious leader, a paranoid leader, a drunk leader…all of these things and too many more have nearly killed us all hundreds and hundreds of times over.
Mostly, we’ve learned mistakes, albeit grudgingly and with resistance from various establishments. Most of America’s ICBMs are solid-fueled, and somewhat safer than the Titan II. Most of our warheads (shame on the Navy!) have been modified to use stable explosives rather than highly unstable compounds to trigger the atomic reaction. Most of the computer hardware is relatively up-to-date, and inventory and control systems are improved. Until Trump, we had moved away from the SIOP and Launch-on-warning.
But there are still problems. Complex, massively integrated systems run by humans are inherently sensitive to failures that ramify well beyond a single point. Our nukes occasionally get sent to the wrong base, or loaded on the wrong system. There are fewer bombs than at the peak of the Cold War, but more countries—including some worrisome ones like Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea—have them. With the United States under Trump alienating its allies, other countries are considering getting into the game. While I was writing this, I learned that the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has moved their famous “doomsday clock” to 85 seconds before midnight: “Catastrophic risks are on the rise, cooperation is on the decline…”
We are part of the problem. Each citizen who can vote elects presidents seemingly without ever considering that we are electing a single individual who can irrevocably, without reason, issue a command to end humanity. The situation is too much like Kurt Vonnegut’s “Cat’s Cradle” in which, by a combination of whim and accident, a suicidal dictator takes the entire world with him to the grave—only, in America, we choose it.
Trump himself is uniquely terrifying. His weird psychology makes him want to use maximum force and bluster, so he wants more nuclear weapons and to restart testing just so he looks strong. He is also increasingly non compos mentis, but nobody in his political party seems capable of saying no to him. There is no precedent or plan for this in our command and control systems. In the last months of Nixon’s administration, he was paranoid and using too much alcohol, but: his advisors made it clear that generals should check with them before acting on his orders. It’s not clear that there is such a check on Trump. Picture him, at 2:00 AM one of those nights where he is just posting and posting on his phone, aggrieved because a Black, female mayor or governor smacked him around politically and publicly embarrassed him, needing to lash out to restore his ego…
Schlosser’s book is definitely worth a read. Misery loves company, and I would like your company in the misery of better understanding the world we live in. The account of the Damascus incident is gripping, although the book is occasionally disorienting as it goes back and forth between that and various times and places from 1945 to 2013. It’s a long-ish book, and it certainly won’t help you to sleep better at night. However, it will make you appreciate the miracle of your continued existence, help you understand more about some of the forces important in the world, and maybe change your mind about nuclear weapons.









